7. Trust

Friendship also requires trust. Aristotle writes that "the friendship of good men implies mutual trust" and Cicero says that "the foundation of that steadfastness and loyalty for which we are looking in friendship is trust, for nothing endures that cannot be trusted." This trust, which is crucial to the existence of friendship, goes hand in hand with honesty; in fact, honesty naturally flows out of trust. Cicero suggests this when he observes that "hypocrisy is vicious... it is particularly inimical to friendship, for it makes honesty impossible, and without honesty the word 'friendship' has no meaning." If a friend is not honest with us, we can no longer trust him. This puts an end to friendship because a friend is, by Emerson's definition, someone who can be trusted and with whom we can speak the truth (i.e. be honest). Thus the qualities of trust and honesty are inseparable and both belong to the nature of friendship.

8. Respect

Two people could hardly be considered friends if they did not hold each other in high regard. Friends must see qualities in each other that they admire, or else the relationship will not be a friendship in the highest sense. Aristotle writes that "it is clear that good men alone can be friends on the basis of what they are." In other words, good men respect one another, and this is the basis of true friendship. Indeed, Cicero writes the following epigram in praise of respect: "Take respect out of friendship and you deprive it of its noblest crown." Emerson takes a slightly more moderate view, stating that while respect is an attitude appropriate to friendship, it is most deeply associated with the self: "In strictness, the soul does not respect men as it respects itself." This assertion, however, does not diminish the importance of respect in friendship because, as was mentioned earlier, the attitude we exhibit toward our friends is a mirror of the view we have of ourselves.

9. Justice

Friendship also involves a sense of what is fair and right, a sense of justice. This notion is very important in the writings of Aristotle. For him, the just is something subordinate to friendship: "When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition. In fact, the just in the fullest sense is regarded as constituting an element of friendship." Carrying the idea into his political theory, he views a type of friendship as the bond that creates a coherent state, a bond that provides a certain sort of justice. After a discussion of the different types of political constitutions, he writes that "each of these constitutions exhibits friendship to the same extent that it exhibits [a notion of] what is just." For him, friendship and justice are closely interrelated. Emerson shies away from this practical notion of friendship by stressing that friendship is much more than mere justice and that it cannot be reduced to a fair exchange. In his own words, "We chide the citizen because he makes love a commodity... and quite loses sight of the delicacies and nobility of the relation." This is not a denial of the importance of justice in friendship, but rather a request for a deeper look into the qualities of friendship.

10. Criticism

In addition to treating each other justly, friends offer constructive criticism to one another. According to Aristotle, friends take pleasure in each other's goodness and they "neither go wrong themselves nor let their friends do so." A good man will not tolerate wrongdoing on the part of his friend: "The... man who will put up with -- and likewise refuse to put up with -- the right things in the right manner... is the kind of person we mean when we speak of a 'good friend'." Cicero agrees that friends should correct one another when they stray from prudent behavior, but states that the motive for the criticism must be the benefit of the person criticized: "It often happens that friends must be admonished and even reprimanded, and this we must take in good part when it is offered in a spirit of charity." He continues by saying that flattery is worse than criticism, "for by failing to call wrongdoing to account, it lets a friend fall to his ruin," and concludes that "it is an essential part of true friendship... to offer and to receive admonition." Thus, the exchange of helpful criticism marks a real friendship. In contrast, Montaigne admits a certain reluctance to criticize others: "I do not make it my business to tell the world what it should do -- enough others do that -- but what I do in it." He shows a degree of disdain for criticism and fails to observe that it has a place in friendship. From the tone of his essay, it seems that because true friendship implies the proper choice of friends, he feels that criticism is unnecessary. He is speaking in terms of an ideal friendship, which perhaps excuses this aberration of opinion.

11. Virtue

It is commonly agreed that virtue is related to friendship, but the nature of this relationship is described differently by Aristotle and Cicero. Aristotle claims that friendship is itself a virtue, while Cicero asserts that virtue is a prerequisite to friendship when he says that "without virtue friendship cannot exist at all." In accordance with this view, he says that "nothing... offers stronger incentive to affection" than virtue. Not only does it provide the motivation for friendship, but its presence maintains the relationship: "It is virtue, yes virtue, that initiates and preserves friendship. For it is virtue that is the source of the rational, the stable, the consistent element in life." The question now becomes whether virtue is the cause of friendship (as Cicero says) or its result (as Aristotle asserts). Since there is no contradiction involved in saying that it is both a cause and an effect, the ideas presented by these two writers can be viewed as complementary. In short, virtue makes friendship possible. Saint Thomas Aquinas also talks about virtue and friendship, not in terms of a natural virtue, however, but in reference to the theological virtue of charity. This will be discussed in the section entitled Friendship with God.